I. Introduction
The next generation communication networks are likely to be a combination of wireline and ad hoc networks, which are expected to fulfill a critical role where wired backbone networks are not available or not economical to build. Depending on its power level and on the nature of environmental interference, a node can reach all nodes in a certain range. Typically, the signal power falls as § , where is the distance from the transmitter antenna and is a constant between and depending on the environment [29] . All receivers have the same power threshold for signal detection, which is typically normalized to one. Under the above assumptions, the power required to establish a link between two nodes at distance is . In this paper we assume that nodes are located in a Euclidean space and consider the symmetric energy model. In ad
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hoc networks devices are usually equipped with battery that has a limited power. Thus, among the most crucial issues is that of developing energy-efficient topology control algorithms, which maximize the network lifetime.
Most of the existing works on wireless networks are based on the assumption that there is a centralized control, or the nodes run the same distributed algorithm. While this assumption may hold for some networks, such as military or government networks, it is not valid in general for Internet-like networks. In such a network, nodes are owned by different commercial entities, which are strongly driven by their economic interests. This naturally gives rise to many game-theoretic issues. The stable outcomes of the interaction between non-cooperative selfish agents correspond to Nash equilibria. A Nash equilibrium [27] can be viewed as a solution that selfish agents can agree upon, i.e., the agents have no incentive to deviate. Since Nash equilibria in network games can be much more expensive than the best centralized solution, it is important to consider the implications of selfish behavior on the network performance. Recently, game-theoretical analysis of ad hoc networks has received a great deal of attention [12, 4, 25, 32] .
Traditionally, in Computer Science research has been focused on finding a global optimum. With the emerging interest in computational issues related to game theory, Koutsoupias and Papadimitriou [22] introduced so called price of anarchy. The pessimistic price of anarchy is the ratio between the cost of the worst possible Nash equilibrium (the one with the maximum social cost) and the cost of the social optimum. Roughgarden and Tardos [30] derive the price of anarchy of selfish routing in networks. Ansheleich et al. [2] propose to consider the optimistic price of anarchy, which is the ratio between the cost of the best possible Nash equilibrium (the one with the minimum social cost) and that of the social optimum.
In this paper we consider the following game modeling the creation of a wireless ad hoc network. Each agent (node) has a specific connectivity requirement, i.e., each agent has to build a network in which this requirement is satisfied. In the model without cost sharing, each agent pays only for the transmission power of its own node. We study a novel cost sharing model in which the transmission power of each node can be paid by different agents. The goal of each agent is to pay as little as possible. Note that the price of anarchy measures the cost of lack of coordination between the agents. Thus, we assume that agents have complete information. We consider only pure strategies since mixed Nash equilibria do not seem to be suitable for network design. We study broadcast and convergecast problems, which are fundamental communication tasks in ad hoc networks. In the Broadcast Game, each agent has to establish a directed path between the designated root node and its own node while in the Convergecast Game, each agent has to establish a directed path between its own node and the designated root node.
The rapidly increasing capabilities and low costs of computing and communication devices have made it possible to use wireless networks in a wide range of applications such as real-time multimedia, battlefield communications, and rescue operations. The above applications impose stringent end-to-end latency requirements on the broadcasting time, which is the time taken by the message to reach all the nodes in the network. The latency of a broadcast algorithm is at least " $ , where " is the network diameter. That is due to the fact that the message needs to reach the furthest node from the source. Gaber and Mansour [18] show that for any graph with
, there is a centralized randomized schedule with latency Unfortunately, in the existing minimum-energy broadcast algorithms the latency of the broadcasting tends to be quite large. Note that the minimum energy is attained when the number of relay nodes is maximized, which results in a large network diameter. We consider the problem of bounded-hop broadcast, where the aim is to construct a minimum-energy communication graph of bounded diameter rooted at the source node in which all nodes are covered. Note that there is a trade-off between reaching more nodes in a single hop using higher power and thus decreasing the network diameter and reaching fewer nodes using lower power and thus increasing the network diameter. The unrestricted version of this problem is NP-hard [5] . For a line topology, this problem can be solved optimally using the dynamic programming algorithm of Clementi et al. [11] .
Our results. First we consider the network creation games. For the Broadcast Game with cost sharing, we show that in contrast to the single-source connection game of [2] , a pure Nash equilibrium may not exist and the optimistic price of anarchy is bounded away from one. We also establish that the pessimistic price of anarchy is . We note that the Broadcast Game is impossible without cost sharing. For the Convergecast Game without cost sharing, we demonstrate that the optimistic price of anarchy is § while the pessimistic price of anarchy is . Interestingly, the Convergecast Game has a lower pessimistic price of anarchy compared to that of the strong connectivity game in [13] , that is 4
$
. We also show that if we allow cost sharing, the pessimistic price of anarchy is improved significantly to while the optimistic price of anarchy remains the same.
Then we consider algorithms for centralized network design. For the bounded-hop broadcast problem, we present a simple algorithm that has an approximation factor of
, where " is the bound on the network diameter and`is a constant that depends on . In particular, for & we have`a , and the approximation factor is at most . Thereafter, we derive the bounded-diameter minimum spanning tree (BDMST) algorithm that achieves an approximation factor of , where
is the worst-case ratio between the energy cost of an optimal BDMST and that of an optimal solution for the bounded-hop broadcast problem. However, the running time of this algorithm is rather high because of the complexity of the BDMST problem. Finally, we propose the decremental distance heuristic, which is easy to implement from the practical point of view and has running time (without large hidden coefficients). In addition, we show how to solve optimally in polynomial time the full-duplex connection problem and the generalized multicast and the web-conferencing problems for a fixed number of nodes.
Paper organization. Our model is presented in Section III. Section II describes the related work. We analyze the networks creation games in Section IV. Algorithms for the bounded-hop broadcast problem are presented in Section V. In Section VI we give optimal algorithms for some connectivity problems. We conclude with Section VII.
II. Related Work
Our paper is closely related to the work of Eidenbenz et al. [13] , which considers topology control problems in ad hoc networks, where nodes choose their power levels in order to ensure the desired connectivity properties. Eidenbenz et al. give asymptotically tight bounds on the price of anarchy for the strong connectivity game and demonstrate that for the connectivity game it is NP-complete to decide whether a pure Nash equilibrium exists. In contrast to [13] , we allow cost sharing in our games. Ansheleich et al. [2] consider a network design game for wired networks, where each agent has to connect a set of terminals. Ansheleich et al. show that determining whether a pure Nash equilibrium exists is NP-complete and present a polynomial-time algorithm that computes a y -approximate Nash equilibrium. Differently from [2] we define a cost sharing model for ad hoc networks. Fabricant et al. [14] study a wireline network creation game, where the cost of a node depends on the distances to the other nodes. Contrary to [14] , in our model agents care only about the basic connectivity.
The problem of bounded-hop connectivity has been studied extensively. Optimal algorithms based on dynamic programming for the problem of bounded-hop strong connectivity and the problem of bounded-hop broadcast on a line are presented by Kirousis et al. [20] and Clementi at al. [11] , respectively. Differently from [20, 11] , we consider the bounded-hop broadcast problem for a general topology. Beier et al. [3] and Funke et al. [17] give efficient algorithms for finding a minimum-energy route between two given nodes that uses a bounded number of hops. In contrast to [3, 17] , in our bounded-hop broadcast problem multiple nodes have to be connected. The problem of bounded-hop broadcast is studied in a recent paper by Ambuhl et al. [1] . Ambuhl et al. give a polynomial-time algorithm based on dynamic programming for finding an optimal solution for -hop broadcast with running time and derive a polynomial-time approximation scheme (PTAS) for the case in which the bound on the number of hops is fixed. Contrary to [1] , in this paper we consider the whole range of possible values of the bound on the number of hops. Calinescu et al. [7] study the bounded-hop broadcast problem and present a bicriteria . We note that the algorithms proposed in this paper are much simpler than that in [7] . Krumke et al. [23] consider different topology control problems with additional constraints so as to minimize the total power assigned to nodes.
The problem of minimum-energy broadcasting in which the transmission power of each node has to be determined so that the total power is minimized has received recently a great deal of attention. Differently from our model, in the works below there is no restriction on the number of hops between the root and a leaf node. Cagalj et al. [5] give a proof of NPhardness of the minimum-energy broadcast problem in a Euclidean space. Wieselthier et al. [34] propose three greedy heuristics, namely the minimum spanning tree (MST), the shortest path tree (SPT) and the broadcasting incremental power (BIP), and evaluate them through simulations. Wan et al. [33] present the first analytical results for this problem. In particular, they prove that the approximation ratio of MST is between and § while the approximation ratio of SPT is at least 4 . Flammini et al. [16] establish improved approximation results on the performance of BIP. Several approximation methods with analytical bounds for the asymmetric energy model are proposed by Liang [24] . Some of these results have been improved by Caragiannis at al. [8] for the symmetric energy model. Calinescu et al. [6] consider the problem of maximizing network lifetime as well as different energy efficient network connectivity problems. Cartigny et al. [9] develop localized algorithms for minimum-energy broadcasting.
III. Model and Notation
We assume that there are In a minimum-energy network design problem, the goal is to assign transmission powers to the nodes in order to establish the desired connectivity requirement while minimizing the total energy of the nodes. Note that it is always sufficient to consider at most 4 different transmission ranges for each node, which are the distances to the other nodes and zero transmission range. We denote by 7 i an optimal solution. We say that an algorithm 
III.A. Broadcast and Convergecast Games
We assume that each node is an agent. A strategy of node is a payment function . We assume that nodes have complete information. The game is said to be in a Nash equilibrium if the connectivity requirement of each agent is satisfied and no agent can find a better (with lower cost) alternative strategy with respect to the current strategies of the other agents (i.e., assuming that the strategies of the other agents are fixed).
The social cost of the outcome of a game is the total power of the nodes. For a placement of nodes , we denote the cost of a Nash equilibrium by . We study the Broadcast Game: there is a designated root node that has a message that must be delivered to all nodes, i.e., each node has to establish a directed path . In this game, the transmission power of each node can be paid by different nodes. This model is inspired by the model of [2] for wired networks. We assume that each node, once it is connected, forwards data packets of the other nodes. Observe that the Broadcast Game requires cost sharing, since a node cannot establish a path from the root by controlling only its own power.
We also consider the Convergecast Game: each node has a message that must be delivered to a designated root node , i.e., each node has to establish a directed path . In this game, each node contributes only to the transmission power of its own node, i.e., . This model has been introduced in [13] . We assume that multiple messages can be aggregated into a single packet and thus we count the energy cost of each edge only once (e.g., that is the case in sensor networks). We also extend the analysis of the Convergecast Game to the cost sharing model.
III.B. Bounded-Hop Broadcast
For each node , we consider a shortest path in between a designated root node and . The diameter of the communication graph is the maximal length of such a path. The bounded-hop broadcast problem is to find the energy assignment for broadcast that minimizes the total energy, that is q , subject to the constraint that the diameter of the resulting communication graph is bounded by
, the problem is just the classical minimum-energy broadcast problem, which is NPhard [5] . On the other hand, if
, there exists only a trivial solution in which has the transmission range equal to the distance to the furthest node. We denote this distance by 
IV. Network Creation Games
In this section we consider the network creation games.
IV.A. Broadcast Game
We show that in contrast to the single-source connection game of [2] , a pure Nash equilibrium for the Broadcast Game may not exist and the optimistic price of anarchy is bounded away from one. We also demonstrate that the pessimistic price of anarchy is The following claim characterizes the cost sharing in a Nash equilibrium. . We obtain that the system is not in a Nash equilibrium, which contradicts our assumption. Therefore, m n p & .
Next we give an example of the Broadcast Game for which a pure Nash equilibrium does not exist.
Theorem IV.2 The Broadcast Game with cost sharing may possess no pure Nash equilibrium.
Proof: Consider the following scenario (see Figure  1) . Node is at distance from the root in one direction and two other nodes . We will show that all these situations are unstable, i.e., there exists a node that can decrease its total payment without losing connectivity (assuming that the strategies of the other nodes are fixed). The following theorem shows that the optimistic price of anarchy is greater than § , i.e., there exist scenarios for which the cost of the best Nash equilibrium is worse than the cost of the optimal solution.
Theorem IV. 3 The optimistic price of anarchy for the Broadcast Game with cost sharing is bounded away from § . Proof: Consider the following scenario (see Figure  2 ). There are three rays emanating from the root and the angle between two adjacent rays is § degrees. On the first two rays there are two nodes at distance £ and £ from the root, respectively. On the third ray there is a node at distance from the root. Consider a situation in which the node on the last ray pays to the root for a transmission range of and the furthest node on each of the first two rays pays to the first node on its ray for a transmission range of £ . It is a unique Nash equilibrium provided that no furthest node can benefit from increasing the transmission range of the root, i.e., 
We have that the price of anarchy is bounded away
Note that Now we proceed to study the pessimistic price of anarchy. The following theorem establishes a simple upper bound of 4 , i.e., the pessimistic price of anarchy is proportional to the number of nodes. 4 
Theorem IV.4 The pessimistic price of anarchy for the Broadcast Game with cost sharing is at most

.
The theorem holds due to the fact that no node pays for more energy than i does, otherwise it can establish a path from the root by paying at most u .
The following theorem derives a lower bound of 4 $ on the pessimistic price of anarchy, which nearly matches our upper bound. 
Theorem IV.5 The pessimistic price of anarchy for the Broadcast Game with cost sharing is at least
IV.B. Convergecast Game
We show that for the Convergecast Game, the optimistic price of anarchy is § , while the pessimistic price of anarchy is . Then we extend our results to the cost sharing model. We demonstrate that the pessimistic price of anarchy becomes while the optimistic price of anarchy remains the same. We note that the MST algorithm for strong connectivity proposed by Chen and Huang [10] implicitly finds an optimal solution for the minimum-energy convergecast in polynomial time as the analysis of Kirousis et al. [20] demonstrates.
The following theorem shows that the optimistic price of anarchy is one, i.e., there always exist a Nash equilibrium whose cost is as good as that of the optimal solution.
Theorem IV.6 The optimistic price of anarchy for the Convergecast Game without cost sharing is
is a Nash equilibrium since no node can decrease its transmission range and still stay connected to the root.
Corollary IV.7 There always exists a pure Nash equilibrium for the Convergecast Game without cost sharing.
Next we derive an upper bound of on the pessimistic price of anarchy, i.e., the price of anarchy is proportional to the number of nodes up to a constant power. . We claim that the distance between any two nodes in © ¶ at least ¶ . If it is not the case, at least one node can decrease its transmission power without losing connectivity to the root, which contradicts the stability of a Nash equilibrium. We obtain that µ ® ¶ since 7 i must connect all these nodes to the root. Hence, the cost of the Nash equilibrium is at most Clearly, it is a Nash equilibrium since all nodes are connected to the root and no node can decrease its transmission power. The cost of this Nash equilibrium is is still a Nash equilibrium if each node pays for its own transmission energy. However, we show that the pessimistic price of anarchy drops to , which demonstrates the benefit of cost sharing. .
Theorem IV.8 The pessimistic price of anarchy for the Convergecast Game without cost sharing is at most
Theorem IV.11 The pessimistic price of anarchy for the Convergecast Game with cost sharing is
Proof:
The upper bound follows due to the fact that no node pays for more energy than
does, otherwise it can connect to the root by paying at most u . The construction of the lower bound is identical to that of Theorem IV.9. The only difference is that the distance between the root and the first regular node is (to be specified later). Each regular node, except the last one, fully pays worth of § for its own energy while the energy of the last regular node, that is , which yields the theorem.
V. Bounded-hop Broadcast
In this section we present approximation algorithms for the bounded-hop broadcast problem.
V.A. Simple Algorithm
In this section we give a simple . Now we present two basic algorithms. The first algorithm called root cover (RC) is a trivial approach in which the root covers all the nodes. Note that this algorithm has a good performance for small values of " . A similar claim has been made in [1] without a proof. We present a proof for completeness.
Theorem V.3 ([1])
The approximation factor of the RC algorithm is at most
Proof: Note that the total energy of the root cover algorithm is
. On the other hand, Lemma V.1 implies that the total energy of 7 i
is at least
In the second algorithm, we start from a shortest path tree . If
Step Ì is never executed, we are done. Otherwise, during each iteration we decrease the diameter (the number of layers) by half. We argue that Step Summing over all nodes, we get the total energy is increased by at most a factor of`. Observe that we count the decrease in the energy of even-layer nodes exactly once since each node has a unique parent in i .
Obviously, after at most
, which establishes the theorem.
It follows from the proof that`a for & . Finally, we consider the combined algorithm that selects the best solution among the root cover and the layer contraction algorithms.
Corollary V.5 The approximation factor of the combined algorithm is at most
In particular, for
, and the approximation factor is at most 
V.B. Bounded-Diameter MST Algorithm
In this section we describe an algorithm, which reduces our problem to the BDMST problem. In the BDMST problem, we are given a connected, undirected graph $ approximation algorithm that combines a greedy heuristic and exhaustive search. Naor and Schieber [26] give a polynomial time 
$ -approximation algorithm for directed graphs that uses linear programming, where the path lengths from the root to the rest of the vertices are at most twice the given bound.
We construct a complete weighted graph in which the weight of an edge is the energy required to establish it. Then we apply the algorithm of [26] to this graph and obtain an arborescence, which is used to specify the energy assignment. The BDMST algorithm is described in Figure 6 .
Note that
Step Ì of the BDMST algorithm incurs only a constant blowup in the total energy (see the proof of Theorem V.4). Suppose that the energy cost of an optimal BDMST with diameter " (we count only the heaviest edge incident to each node) is at 1. Apply the MST algorithm [33] and set the transmission range of each node accordingly.
If the diameter of the communication graph is smaller than
" , return the current solution. times larger than the energy cost of an optimal solution for the bounded-hop broadcast problem. We obtain that the BDMST algorithm achieves an approximation factor of . We note that in [33] the complete cost (all edges are counted) of a minimum spanning tree with unbounded diameter is shown to be a constant factor larger than the energy cost of an optimal broadcast with unbounded latency. That is not true in our model since for a star topology and
, the complete cost of an optimal BDMST is 4 § times larger than the cost of an optimal solution for the bounded-hop broadcast problem. However, in this case the energy cost is exactly the same for both solutions and it may still turn out that q 4 $ is a constant.
V.C. Decremental Distance Heuristic for Bounded-Hop Broadcast
In this section we describe the decremental distance heuristic. In a nutshell, we begin with the solution of the MST algorithm. Then we greedily find either the maximal absolute power decrease or the minimal average power increase that decreases the distance of some nodes that are more than " hops apart from the root. This process terminates when the diameter constraint is satisfied. The decremental distance heuristic is presented in Figure 7 . Intuitively, this algorithm will tend to increase the power of the nodes that are closer to the root, which allows us to simultaneously decrease the distance from the root for many nodes.
The following theorem considers the running time of the decremental distance algorithm. Theorem V. 6 The decremental distance algorithm terminates after at most 4 § 4 " iterations and has running time of at most Proof: Clearly, during each iteration we decrease the distance from the root to at least one node that is more than " hops apart and condition (i) guarantees that we do not increase the distance from the root to any node beyond " . Therefore, the algorithm terminates after at most 4 § 4 " iterations. We argue that Step y , which dominates the running time of each iteration, takes at most 1. Apply the MST algorithm [33] and set the transmission power of each node accordingly.
If the diameter of the communication graph is smaller than
" , return the current solution. . Clearly, we can check the conditions (i) and (ii) in 
VI. Communication Problems
In this section we consider different minimum-energy communication problems in ad hoc networks and reduce them to connectivity problems in a directed weighted graph. 2 A similar reduction has been used in [24, 8] to develop approximation algorithms. Contrary to [24, 8] , we derive optimal solutions.
Given the placement of nodes . We wish to establish a full-duplex connection between À and . We use an algorithm proposed by Natu and Fang [28] in order to solve the fol- 2 We note that our reduction works also for the asymmetric energy model, where the energy cost of an edge . We apply the algorithm of [28] with Û as the input graph to obtain an optimal solution in . We wish the transmission from each sender to reach all the receivers, i.e., to establish directed paths from every node of to every node of Û . We assume that different transmissions can be aggregated if they pass through the same edge. We use the algorithm provided by Feldman and Ruhl [15] for the p-Directed Steiner Network problem. In this problem, we are given a directed weighted graph 
Ý
) is the number of nodes (resp. edges) in . We apply the algorithm of [15] to Û with ô ô Û input pairs of nodes
